9-13-09

NASA Safety Culture Survey Overview

Background

The concept of organizational culture as a management tool was popularized in the 1980s.  Then, following the Chernobyl nuclear incident in 1986, the notion of “safety culture” gained wide-spread acceptance.  The ultimate goal of a strong safety culture is to prevent accidents.  Studies of several high-profile accidents suggest that a poor safety culture may contribute to their cause.[1]

Safety literature distinguishes between “safety culture” and “safety climate.”  Weigmann, et al; defined safety climate as “the temporal state measure of safety culture, subject to commonalities among individual perceptions of the organization.  It is therefore situationally based, refers to the perceived state of safety at a particular place at a particular time, is relatively unstable, and subject to change depending on the features of the current environment or prevailing conditions.”[2]  On the other hand, safety culture is a more enduring, stable quality of organizations characterized by the values, attitudes, and patterns of behaviors of organizational members and the importance that the organization places on safety.  James Reason, a noted scholar in organization management theory, described safety culture as basically an “informed culture” created by the interaction of four subcomponents: a reporting culture, just culture, flexible culture, and learning culture:[3] 

Reason’s notion of safety culture has taken root and is used, for example, in the U.S. Air Force, in the FAA, and in the Joint Planning and Development Office’s (JPDO’s) implementation plan for the Next Generation Air Transport System (NextGen).[4]  JPDO also used these concepts of a healthy safety culture in the Safety Culture Improvement Resource Guide.[5]

NASA Safety Culture Survey

The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA), along with subject matter experts from each of the NASA centers developed the NASA Safety Culture Survey.  This survey is based upon prevailing theories for a healthy safety culture.  The model’s subcomponents have been adapted for NASA use, as described below:

Reporting Culture:  We report our concerns.  We encourage everyone to report safety concerns to create and sustain a healthy reporting culture. Leaders and employees foster an atmosphere of trust with employees reporting information and appropriate action being taken.

Just Culture: We have a sense of fairness.  A Just Culture ensures psychological safety in the workplace. Psychological safety describes a shared belief held by team members who understand that expressing ideas and concerns, asking questions, and admitting mistakes without fear of negative consequences, builds a safer and more successful organization. People clearly understand acceptable and unacceptable behaviors and everyone is treated fairly.

Flexible Culture: We change to meet new demands.  A Flexible Culture builds in resilience from the beginning. Employees make changes based on incoming information. This enables organizations to adapt to unforeseen developments and capitalize on new opportunities.

Learning Culture: We learn from our successes and mistakes.  In a Learning Culture, tools exist for employees to collect, assess, share, and integrate information, both formally and informally. Examples include the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Portal, the Safety Culture web page, and continuing education programs such as the Safety and Mission Assurance (SMA) Technical Excellence Program, as well as resources on the NASA Engineering Network and NASA Safety Center websites.